

May-June 1976

EMERGENCY  
PLANNING  
**Digest**

---



Emergency Planning  
Canada

Planification d'urgence  
Canada

# EMERGENCY PLANNING Digest

---

Vol. 3, No. 3

May-June 1976

## Contents

Provincial Emergency Measures	JOHN HANNIGAN RODNEY KUENEMAN . . .	2
EMO Defies Oblivion	GEORGE HUTCHISON . . . . .	8
USSR CD in the Seventies	LEON GOURE . . . . .	13
Quebec Civil Protection	F. LEMIEUX . . . . .	17

Published by:  
EMERGENCY PLANNING CANADA  
Ottawa, Ontario.

Director General: C. R. Patterson

The EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST publishes six editions annually to provide current information and reference material on a broad range of subjects dealing with civil emergency planning. Copies may be received regularly by written request to Editor, Emergency Planning Canada, Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0W6.

In addition to publishing articles which reflect Canadian and foreign policies or activities Digests may also publish articles by private individuals on subjects of interest to emergency planning programs. Such DIGEST articles and views expressed by contributors are not necessarily subscribed to by the Government of Canada or EPC.

Editor: Alex. M. Stirton

---

© Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1976  
K1A 0S9

# PROVINCIAL EMERGENCY MEASURES

by

John A. Hannigan and Rodney Kueneman\*

The following case study has been extracted from a paper prepared for the Disaster Research Center of Ohio State University entitled "Factors Influencing the Saliency and Legitimacy of Public Organizations.

The research reported here was initially undertaken as a study of the response of public organizations in a province to severe flooding of a major river in early spring, 1973 (EMO National Digests August-September 1973 and October-November, 1973). At this time, two Canadian staff members of the Disaster Research Center conducted interviews with municipal, provincial, and federal government officials, military personnel, and representatives of the mass media and the provincial power company. These semi-structured, tape-recorded interviews were carried out at the Emergency Operating Center (E.O.C.) in the provincial capital — the communication and coordination center of the flood response.

Eleven months later, a follow-up study was conducted, focusing upon the current state of the Provincial Emergency Measures Organization (E.M.O.), which had emerged as the chief coordinating agency during the 1973 flood response. At this time, the history of the organization was studied in depth, using newspaper reports and editorials, legislative records, pertinent interorganizational letters and documents, as well as interview material to reconstruct the origins and experience of the organization prior to the flood.

## Organizational Background and History

### Origins

The Canadian Emergency Measures Organization<sup>1</sup>, the national equivalent of the provincially-based E.M.O., was established by the federal government in 1957. In its early years, its activities were primarily devoted to devising plans and preparations designed to counter the harmful after-effects of potential nuclear warfare. Given the context of the Cold War politics of the late fifties and early sixties, this nuclear attack orientation appeared relevant and the organization flourished.

\* The field research for this study, and the analysis undertaken, was conducted when both authors held Emergency Planning Canada fellowships at the Disaster Research Center at the Ohio State University (Mr. Kueneman is now on the faculty of the University of Calgary). In addition, special support for the field research was provided by Emergency Planning Canada. We wish to thank both Emergency Planning Canada and the Disaster Research Center for their assistance and help in doing this research. However, all views expressed and interpretations of the data made are our own, and do not necessarily represent the views and interpretations made by either of these organizations. — July 1975.

<sup>1</sup> now known as Emergency Planning Canada.

In addition to the national organization, each province also had its own E.M.O. operating under a cost-sharing plan with the federal government. In the province under study, the E.M.O. was initially divided into three segments based on provincial, county, and municipal organizations. All efforts in this field were supervised and controlled by the province and depended mainly on volunteers. In 1967 there was a major change in the concept of provincial government operations, centralizing many of the responsibilities of the municipal government system. As a consequence of this, E.M.O. became a solely provincial operation based on a provincial headquarters and five areas, each with its own headquarters and a small staff. Like the federal organization, the major thrust of E.M.O. operations in the province at this time was directed towards civil defense, specifically that pertaining to the consequences of nuclear attack.

### The Loss of Organizational Legitimacy

Brinkerhoff and Kunz (1972, p. xviii) have pointed out that, within the external environment of an organization, there is an ideology which imposes restrictions on it and, in part, shapes the nature of organi-

zational decisions. Thus, Young and Larson (1965) found that among voluntary organizations in a community, those who most nearly embodied the value constellations of the community of which they were a part were awarded the highest prestige rankings. On the other hand, organizations whose purpose and goals were out of sync with the dominant community and societal ideology risk loss of legitimacy, and sometimes functional obsolescence. This is essentially what happened to the Provincial E.M.O.

By the middle sixties, the international situation was changing, and with it the perceived appropriateness of a strong civil defense organization. In the Kremlin, the colorful and dramatic shoe-pounding antics of the Khrushchev era had given way to the low-key rule of the Brezhnev-Kosygin group. On the world front, The Cold War appeared to deescalate, and peaceful coexistence seemed more probable. In 1968, the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks began, reinforcing this more optimistic climate.

In this context, the nuclear response orientation appeared to lose its relevance. With the immediate military threat now softened, it became impossible to maintain a widespread, continuing interest in such preparatory activities such as the construction of bomb shelters. In addition, official thinking on the nature of nuclear confrontation changed. Previously, plans had been based on the expectation that a nuclear attack, if it came, would be sudden and unforeseeable; now it was thought that a preliminary period of rising tension and conventional warfare would precede any nuclear exchange. In this context, it no longer seemed as vital to have a pre-established network of supplies and volunteers, as these could be recruited in time if a nuclear attack appeared imminent.

The financial guillotine fell first towards the national organization, which had a 25 percent budget reduction in 1968. The Provincial Government announced a major reorganization of the Provincial E.M.O., reducing staff to one full-time officer and his secretary. Also, the inventory of equipment accumulated by E.M.O. was transferred to departments of government whose normal activities were allied to a number of responsibilities previously the sole jurisdiction of the Provincial E.M.O. Accordingly, the organization's budget was slashed by nearly 75 percent of its 1967 funds. In the words of a member of the Provincial Government who initiated these measures: "There was very little these people could or were asked to do." Public

reaction to these government moves was weak; in the province's two main urban newspapers, for example, it was limited to one newspaper editorial questioning the hasty dissolution of the wider organization, supported by two letters to the editor. For all extensive purposes, then, by 1968 the Provincial E.M.O. had lost all its manpower, most of its funds, and much of its legitimacy.

### **Reformulation of Goals: The Environmental Context**

Thompson and McEwen (1958) have specified one of the requirements for organizational survival to be "the ability to learn about the environment accurately enough and quickly enough to permit organizational adjustments in time to avoid extinction." As Sills (1961) demonstrated in his study of the March of Dimes organization, by successfully redirecting itself to new goals, an organization can overcome internal inertia and external lack of support, and thus recast its existence in a more acceptable framework. Similarly, Zald and Denton (1963) found that the Y.M.C.A. transformed its objectives from those of a largely evangelical and religious nature to those emphasizing more secular aspects such as crafts and physical education in order to maintain itself in the face of the growing secularization of American society. These new goals must be considered not only as relevant, but they must also direct the organization's activities to a distinctive "domain" where they do not threaten the claim of another more powerful organization. In short, as Randall (1973, p. 237) has suggested, the "healthy" organization must establish and maintain a distinct "policy space".

By the time of its near demise in 1968, E.M.O. officials, as well as E.M.O. personnel in other provinces, had realized that the possible resurgence of the organization depended upon a practical reconceptualization of the organization's purpose and goals. As a result, a new view of E.M.O. crystallized which stressed peacetime planning for natural disasters such as floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes. E.M.O.'s role in this was to act as an educator and planner in non-disaster times, and as an organizer and coordinator in times of disaster, while leaving most of the actual physical disaster-coping activities, such as search and rescue, to existing community organizations and institutions.

The next step here was for the organization to mobilize support for this new orientation, particularly at the cabinet level of the provincial and

federal governments. E.M.O. was successful in gaining such support at both levels of government. In December of 1969, a Federal-Provincial Conference on Emergency measures was held in Ottawa, and the federal Minister of Defence, who was responsible for Canada E.M.O., received this view of E.M.O.'s role positively. In the Province, the newly-elected government, and especially the Municipal Affairs Minister, became convinced that it was dysfunctional to the public safety to have a situation where there was no one to coordinate the efforts of the fire and police departments, the army, private relief organizations and others involved in coping with natural disasters, and that the Provincial E.M.O. could take on this role successfully. Consequently, the Provincial Government announced an expanded E.M.O. would be legislated, with a 65 percent budget increase and six new full-time employees. Key additions here were a training officer, a planning officer, an emergency health officer, and a seventh member, an emergency welfare officer to be added soon after.

### **The Process of Reorganization**

By April 1973, then, E.M.O. was a reemergent and revitalized organization in the province. Staff members had been recruited and were in the process of settling into their new positions. Since the organization was essentially new, both in form and purpose, it did face what Stinchcombe (1965) has termed the "liability of newness." This meant that new roles had to be learned, loyalties built up and decision-making criteria formulated. Equally important was the lack of stable ties to those who could be regarded as clients or potential users of E.M.O. services. This was particularly relevant to relationships with other provincial officials, and with municipal officials from the myriad of small towns and villages throughout the largely rural province.

In this connection, the organization did have some advantages. Those recruited for the new posts were essentially career civil servants, most with military experience. They were thus able to transfer certain generalized organizing skills to their new positions. In addition, the director of the Provincial E.M.O. at this time was a former provincial cabinet member, well-known in government circles throughout the Province. As the director's position was part-time, he also held a high-ranking administrative position in the Department of

Municipal Affairs, and thus possessed wide experience, an extensive net of contacts, and a pre-existing degree of legitimacy and authority. Finally, because the central organization was small, the new staff was able to mold rapidly into a cohesive, informal unit. Nevertheless, the onus was on E.M.O. to demonstrate that it could play a valuable role in a disaster situation and that it was not, as the opposition party claimed, a "farce."

### **The Reemergence of Legitimacy: The Flood Response**

In this context, the major river in the Province flooded its banks in the early spring of 1973. Seriously affected was a 100-mile stretch of land along the river including the provincial capital, where E.M.O. headquarters was located. Over 2,500 private homes were flooded and 1,600 persons were forced to leave their homes. Since the Provincial E.M.O. had only recently been expanded, no formal, up-to-date plan existed, and most of the staff had only a limited idea of their realm of responsibility. Nevertheless, an Emergency Operating Center (E.O.C.) was set up by E.M.O. in the provincial hydro building and strategy meetings with other relevant officials began. Since few officials from other departments involved in the E.O.C. operation knew one another, there was an internal coordination vacuum which E.M.O. quickly filled. E.M.O. officials made a concerted effort early in the flood response to assign tasks to various groups in the E.O.C. and arranged for the relevant information and requests, both internal and external, to be funnelled to them. Having established five chief task areas — warning, evacuation, accommodation, feeding, and health and agriculture — E.M.O. supplemented manpower resources available at the initial outset of the E.O.C. operation by calling in resource people from appropriate organizations and assigning them to one of the task areas. The core of this coordinating activity was a communications room in which an E.M.O. officer received and redirected all incoming requests for assistance.

As a result of its foresight and initiative, the Provincial E.M.O. emerged as the chief coordinating organization in the flood response. Information about the flooding was widely reported, both in the Province and across Canada, and it was the E.M.O. officials who were most frequently consulted and cited in the media stories. Because of its central role in the flood response, E.M.O.

achieved a new level of visibility and legitimacy in the eyes of all who might be considered its "relevant others." Even the opposition leader in the legislature conceded that the organization had proven itself a worthwhile expenditure. Thus, the organization's expansion was stabilized and even enhanced by its own effective performance in a disaster situation.

### **The Period of Consolidation**

While E.M.O. had reestablished its legitimacy among both legislators and the public in the Province, it was still necessary for it to establish a viable domain for its activities during non-disaster times. Otherwise, it faced the danger of being vulnerable to future budget cuts based on inability to demonstrate that it was engaging in incisive ongoing programs.

In the year following the flood, E.M.O. consolidated its position in three significant ways. First of all, through extensive planning and education programs it concentrated on building up a strong network of interorganizational relationships throughout the Province. For example, E.M.O., upon request, assisted hospital administrators in developing and testing hospital disaster exercises necessary for hospital accreditation in the Province. This contributed significantly to new levels of interface between hospital and community disaster planning. Similarly, E.M.O. assisted a number of municipalities, many of whom had not previously engaged in any type of disaster planning, in formulating local community disaster plans. In the social services sector, an emergency welfare services plan was initiated for the whole Province, and work was begun towards integrating this with local community planning. Contingency planning was carried out with the Canadian armed forces and with the R.C.M.P., who act as the provincial police force, and an arrangement was negotiated with the Provincial Department of Highways and Forestry to link E.M.O. with their communications system. Other activities included: educating provincial and municipal officials in disaster-relevant skills; initiating a province-wide attempt to locate and catalogue various types of disaster and emergency-relevant equipment, both in the public and private sectors; and conducting simulated disaster drills.

Secondly, E.M.O. accepted short-run, emergency-related tasks in order to maintain support for the longer range planning types of activities. As the energy crisis dawned during the winter of 1974,

the Provincial Government asked E.M.O. to take on a new activity — developing a home heating oil contingency plan. Subsequently, a temporary staff was hired to assist in designing a home heating oil allocation system.

Thirdly, E.M.O. was careful not to over-expand in the immediate post-disaster period when there was a manifold increase in requests for planning assistance and training. This strategy put the organization in a position where it was not left with surplus personnel, equipment, etc., when the tide of client requests for services ebbed back to a lower level, and when financial austerity forced cutbacks in departments which appeared to be carrying excess personnel and physical resources.

It is clear then, from the experience of this E.M.O., that by formulating incisive strategies, a public organization can successfully recast its image, refurbish its legitimacy, and stabilize its position in a potentially destructive environment.

### **Discussion**

Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p. 127) have pointed out that an organization facing problems of legitimacy can do three things to attempt to counteract the situation: (1) the organization can adapt its output, goals, and methods of operation to conform to prevailing definitions of legitimacy; (2) it can attempt through communication to alter the definition of social legitimacy so that it conforms to the organization's present practices, outputs, and values; and (3) it can attempt through communication to become identified with symbols, values, or institutions which have a strong base of social legitimacy.

The present study best fits the first of these responses and further suggests a number of specific factors which can undercut or enhance the legitimacy of public organizations along with various coping strategies linked to these influencing factors.

First of all, to be considered legitimate and viable, a public organization must be able to give a clear accounting of the nature and significance of its manifest goals and functions. In turn, these must be perceived by others as relevant well-defined, distinctive and not seriously overlapping those of existing organizations. In the Province, and indeed throughout Canada, E.M.O. supporters failed to persuasively articulate the purpose and

value of civil defense, nor were they successful in broadening its definition to include events less distant than a future Armageddon. Consequently, civil defense and E.M.O. became somewhat murky concepts in the public mind, most often identified with one minor phase of the organization's activities — constructing "bomb shelters." It was only when faced with a survival situation that reconceptualization was carried out and sold to those responsible for its funding. Functional clarity, then, can significantly affect organizational legitimacy.

Closely related to this is the appropriateness of an organization for the environment in which it exists. That is, an organization may have a clearly stated purpose, meet what is later seen as a valid need, perform competently, and yet still suffocate in an atmosphere of rarified credibility. In the era of the fifties, for example, an environmental protection agency or a consumer affairs department would have been out of sympathy with the prevailing public mood, and thus considered inappropriate, despite a real but largely unperceived need for such organizations. Similarly, in the late sixties, the still prevalent nuclear attack orientation of E.M.O. was considered inappropriate by a public who no longer lived in immediate fear of enemy missiles, but rather looked more optimistically towards detente and peaceful coexistence. Public organizations then, particularly if they are on the edge of significant public policy issues, must be cognizant of prevailing values and ideologies in order to ensure their own appropriateness.

Thirdly, organizational legitimacy can be influenced by the degree to which an organization possesses what Selznick (1957) has called a "distinctive competence." When E.M.O. was reduced in size, budget, and resources, critics justified this on the basis that the organization performed no unique tasks which existing organizations could not carry out. When the provincial government approved an expanded E.M.O. organization, they did so on the recognition that the ability to successfully coordinate disaster-coping activities is indeed a distinctive skill. That E.M.O. emerged as the chief coordinating agency during the flood response appears to validate the fact that the organization did possess a significant degree of distinctive competence.

Fourthly, a public organization's legitimacy can vary with economic fluctuations in the primary system within which the public organization is situated. These economic fluctuations in turn change the value of the cost-benefit payoff of the

organization for its relevant others. The determination of the degree of payoff often depends on the general state of the economy. In periods of heavy deficit spending, recession, or other types of economic distress, a search is often initiated for ways of reducing spending by cutting back or eliminating organizations whose size and/or existence seemed more defensible in other times. What was seen as a benefit under more favorable financial conditions may now become a luxury. What may have been perceived as a reasonable expense before may now be viewed as unjustified. Under these conditions, organizations which formerly may have been considered a justifiable expenditure may now have their legitimacy undercut by budgetary considerations. In a changed financial environment of this type, such perceived basic needs as energy production are emphasized at the expense of more vulnerable areas like education and social planning. In the case of E.M.O. it was a financial cut-back at the federal level which triggered a series of decisions resulting in the shrinkage of the provincial organization. Clearly, the status of the organization had been marginal for some time, but had the federal reductions not forced a cost-benefit reevaluation at the provincial level, E.M.O. might have forestalled any change. The public organization then, must be constantly sensitive to what tangible, salient benefits it can provide to its clientele, given present needs and financial fluctuations.

Fifthly, the pattern of interrelationships between a public organization's relevant others can often influence its saliency and/or legitimacy. This pattern is rarely uniform, but rather is a fluid mixture distilled from the interaction between four chief entities — the public, the media, the legislators, and other public organizations. Influence here is a multi-step process. In one common scenario, the first step consists of the media in their surveillance role, acting as the watchdog of governmental activity. In the second step, the public, or at least influential segments of it, are mobilized by the media and join with it to inform legislators of their disgruntlement. In the third step, the legislators, if they interpret this feedback as significant, use their funding power to bring about a change in the organization.

Just as a coalition of the media and the public acts to force change in an organization, it is also possible for such an alliance to act against change, particularly if this change means virtual or actual destruction of the organization. In the case of this



E.M.O., such a coalition failed to occur, and with the exception of the previously noted editorial and two letters to the editor, there was public apathy at the shrinkage of E.M.O. in 1968. This was in evident contrast to the situation during and immediately following the flood when both media coverage and public opinion were actively supportive of the E.M.O.

Other public organizations play a more indirect, but still significant role in influencing organizational legitimacy. By withholding cooperation in a situation requiring coordination in order to carry out a joint task successfully, or by engaging in functional cooptation — intriguing to take over another's tasks and functions — they can damage that agency's image of competence and authority. Alternatively, by allowing what Levine and his colleagues have termed "domain consensus" (Levine, et al. 1963), other organizations can contribute positively to the legitimacy of its neighbor department or agency. By deferring to the Provincial E.M.O. in setting up the coordination and communication structure at the E.O.C. during the flood response, other public organizations gave it a "functional space" from which to further reestablish its legitimacy.

Finally, there is the obvious, but significant, matter of performance competency. Organizational legitimacy requires perceived effectiveness and while this depends in part on image management, it also depends on actual competence. This can

greatly enhance legitimacy, as occurred in the case of this E.M.O., but its absence can also bring about a swift decline in the future of the public organization. This is particularly true when poor performance will result in the usurpation of tasks or functions by a competing organization.

Keeping these six factors in mind, it is further possible to delineate six strategies suggested by the experience of the E.M.O. under study which can assist the public agency or department in consolidating its position in a potentially hostile environment. These are as follows: (1) possession of a distinctive battery of skills and resources not otherwise available to the community; (2) consonance of organizational goals and functions with the needs of those it is serving; (3) maintenance of a net of interpersonal relations with officials from other public and private organizations which can be utilized in time of crises as well as on an everyday basis; (4) the capability of justifying existing staff and physical resources in terms of the tangible benefits which each is able to deliver; (5) the capability of handling short-run, emergency-related tasks in order that support may be maintained for less critical long-range planning activities; and (6) efficient and competent task performance and conveyance of this image to the mass media.

Such actions as these can be highly beneficial in assisting the public organization to adapt successfully to its social, political and economic environments. ▲

## REFERENCES

- Brinkerhoff, Merlin and Philip R. Kunz  
1972 *Complex Organizations and their Environments*. Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers.
- Dowling, John, and Jeffrey Pfeffer  
1975 "Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and Organizational Behavior." *Pacific Sociological Review* 18 (January): 122-136.
- Dynes, Russell R., and E. L. Quarantelli  
1975 "The Role of Local Civil Defense in Disaster Planning." Disaster Research Center Report Series #16. Columbus, Ohio: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University.
- Levine, Sol, Paul E. White and Benjamin D. Paul  
1963 "Community Interorganizational Problems in Providing Medical Care and Social Services." *American Journal of Public Health* 53: 1183-1195.
- Randall, Ronald  
1973 "Influence of Environmental Support and Policy Space on Organizational Behavior." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 18: 236-247.
- Selznick, Philip  
1957 *Leadership in Administration*. New York: Row, Peterson and Co.

- Sills, David L.  
1961 "The Succession of Goals." in Amitai Etzioni (ed.) *Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 146-159.
- Stinchcombe, Arthur L.  
1965 "Social Structures and Organizations." in James G. March (ed.) *Handbook of Organizations*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 142-193.
- Thompson, James D. and W. J. McEwen  
1958 "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interaction Process." *American Sociological Review* 23: 23-31.
- Walmsley, Garry L. and M. N. Zald  
1973 "The Political Economy of Public Organizations." *Public Administrative Review* 33 (January-February): 62-73.
- Young, Ruth C. and Olaf F. Larson  
1965 "The Contribution of Voluntary Associations to Community Structure." *American Journal of Sociology* 71: 178-186.
- Zald, M. N. and P. Denton  
1963 "From Evangelism to General Service: The Transformation of the Y.M.C.A." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 8: 214-234.



## RELIC OF PARANOIC '50s, EMO DEFIES OBLIVION

Federal fund maintains emergency measures planner who work out disaster scénarios

by  
George Hutchison  
of the Free Press\*

*Communism aims to achieve world domination, preferably without war, but, if necessary, through war . . . When the time is ripe, if and when the time ever comes, communism will endeavor to strike a knock-out blow with every weapon at its command, including fission and thermo-nuclear weapons and nerve gas.*

— London civil defence committee, 1954.

*We will bury you.*

— Nikita Khrushchev, 1956.

Architect Arthur Townsend blasted a \$2,500 hole into the rock of Sudbury, beneath his new home, capped it with a foot-thick slab of concrete and guarded it with a cement maze.

The 14-by-15-foot chamber was rigged for a chimney and a gravity feed line to a 500-gallon oil tank. Space was made for an air feed and a water tank was installed.

"We got a lot of teasing," Townsend remembers. "Hey, I've got four kids. Are you going to let us in?" And we used to kid them. "We're going to stand there with a gun and shoot anyone who comes in the house."

In London, the Dicy family built a 32-by-42-foot shelter in their backyard, an elaborate five-room bunker worth about \$16,000. The Dicys actually moved in.

The shelter was buried beneath 240 tons of clay and rock, stockpiled with food and equipped with a flamethrower to repel enemies or unwanted guests.

"The purpose of the shelter is to insure life," Fred Dicy said at the time. "To admit more persons than could be provided for, or persons already contaminated would defeat the purpose."

The edgy federal government wanted all Canadians to build fall-out shelters, if not as elaborate as the Townsends' and Dicys', at least sufficient to provide basic protection against radioactive dust from a nuclear blast.

The department of national defence provided plans for a \$300 basement installation and called it a "blueprint for survival."

"These shelters will be a practical and reasonable means of ensuring one's family against the risk that would arise should a war occur," said Prime Minister John Diefenbaker.

"Each householder should decide whether or not to have this form of family protection. I recommend it."

Less than 20, however, were ever built in London, most of them in secret for fear of detection and possible ridicule.

"It was like the little pig building the brick cottage and waiting for the wolf to come," says one Londoner, who would talk only if he remained an unidentified shelter builder. "You sit and wait and if the wolf comes he's not going to blow it over."

The shelter was actually constructed by his father, a veteran of two world wars.

"It was a lot of peace of mind for someone like father, who had been through it. He went through two world wars and he knew what it was like to be bombed. We in Canada don't really understand that."

The Londoner has grown, like most others, to the conviction that holocaust in our time is unlikely — "Nobody thinks about it. Nobody talks about it. So we go on our merry way. I've come around to that way of thinking too. I don't really have a great concern about a third world war now. The shelter is there (used for storage), but I don't think we are going to need it."

That was not the mood through the '50s and '60s, however.

Diefenbaker committed Canada to partnership with the United States in a Distant Early Warning system, a string of radar stations across the Arctic, and the Americans stepped up flights by A-bomb-armed bombers to the northern rim of the Soviet Union. Missile technology was also intensified.

\*With kind permission of the London Free Press

# Relic of paranoid '50s, EMO defies oblivion

Federal fund maintains emergency measures planners who work out disaster scenarios

By GEORGE HUTCHINSON  
in The Free Press

Continuation of an earlier report.  
Disaster scenarios without end, the  
of emergency, though that, when the  
time is right, if and when the time is  
right, emergency will continue to exist  
in the community, including federal and  
disaster measures and more so.

—London civil defence  
committee, 1954

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation



Two men sit with the OPP on accidents and helped  
disaster measures. It was essential to do.

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

Two men sit with the OPP on accidents and helped  
disaster measures. It was essential to do.

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

Two men sit with the OPP on accidents and helped  
disaster measures. It was essential to do.

—The British Broadcasting  
Corporation

"We are not preparing for wartime disasters," he  
said. "That doesn't mean it could not happen. But,  
when a crisis, very far from the plan from the  
present, individual efforts will be made."

"Continuing possible disaster scenarios, he pointed  
out, is to keep the disaster planning of the  
present. To build a disaster here and there, what  
does that do? At last, you will have disaster at the  
time of disaster."

"If I was in a larger area, I would accept and work  
on it. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

"I don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer. I  
don't want to be a crisis officer. I don't want to be  
a crisis officer. I don't want to be a crisis officer."

At home, civil defence organizations, leftovers  
from the Second World War, evolved into a new  
federal brainchild, the Emergency Measures Orga-  
nization (EMO), and communities across Canada  
were encouraged to prepare for holocaust.

Hurried installation of air raid sirens was under-  
taken and, in London, the old Chelsea Green  
Public School at Thompson Road and Adelaide  
Street became the hub for a radio ham-operated  
communications network.

Highway 2 was declared a military road and  
there were exercises, lots of exercises. A mock  
attack in November, 1961, killed 2.6 million Cana-  
dians, including Diefenbaker and Gov.-Gen.  
Georges Vanier. A million more were dying, trapped  
in the 15 cities, attacked by 250 Russian  
bombers and 70 missiles.

Across the nation, local EMO committees, funded  
by the federal and provincial governments, re-  
cruited constables to bring order out of potential  
chaos.

Neil Morris, a Free Press reporter, recalls his  
days as an EMO officer in North Bay: "It was a  
lot of fun. You went out with the OPP on accidents  
and helped them measure. It was something to do."

All of the activity sprang out of a rhetoric that  
was volatile, threatening, scary.

"We were all worried about war," remembers  
Ontario Treasurer Darcy McKeough. "We are not  
as worried now."

With that, at this year's end, Queen's Park cuts  
the flow of funds to support what remains of EMO,  
the product of a Cold War that never grew hot.

EMO "has outlived its usefulness," the provin-  
cial government decided earlier this year.

Where it survives — federal funds keep it alive  
in fact if not in spirit — EMO takes the form of  
planning committees or officers who now devote  
their time planning for potential peacetime disas-  
ters, rather than wartime holocausts.

Several area municipalities are grappling with the question of scrapping the operation altogether as a relic of a paranoic period in history.

Federal funds will continue to be available, which is why EMO managed to last so long in the first place, according to McKeough.

"It wouldn't have lasted if it hadn't been funded 90 per cent by the senior government," he says, "Nobody at the local level ever thought it was necessary, except the co-ordinators. And how could you turn down 90 cents on the dollar?"

The provincial government was never heavily committed to EMO in a financial sense. The budget this year is under \$1 million. The government was drawn into the program by the prevailing mood, which was ugly.

"It was at the height of the McCarthy thing and atomic bombs and so on," McKeough explains. "But surely once you develop a contingency plan, it doesn't take a full-time staff to keep the thing up to date."

Now the emphasis is on peacetime planning, there are sufficient staffs available in existing government ministries and city departments to cope. There is no need, according to the treasurer, "to spend a couple of million bucks a year to have a whole lot of retired majors and captains running around."

"Priorities change," he says, "and it's not a question of cutting out waste but of reordering priorities. The money can be better spent elsewhere and some people can double up on the job."

Fifteen years ago, civil defence was given high priority. The Berlin wall stood tall and communism was invading the western hemisphere through Cuba.

In October, 1962, the world moved to the brink when U.S. President John Kennedy told Nikita Khrushchev to get his nuclear missiles out of Cuba or face an armed confrontation.

The crisis was real, not imagined. London city council stockpiled \$2,500 worth of emergency food rations and offered sandbags to citizens for basement shelters at 15 cents each. By mid-November, 859 bags were sold. Citizens had to buy their own sand.

That year, city hall issued 10 building permits for shelters, an all-time high.

But the crisis led to a lingering international standoff, better communications between the

superpowers and halting steps toward a goal of curbing the proliferation of devastating weaponry.

By 1963, London's caustic mayor, Gordon Stronach, was attacking EMO's worth.

"The type of people who would be satisfied to work on EMO duties in these tranquil times are not likely to be the people one would look to for leadership in an emergency," he said.

By 1968, Ottawa — claiming technological improvements — began selling off the 8-by-12 foot shelters that had been slipped beneath sand dunes near railway stations for use as reporting outposts. The public was told they would make great chicken coops.

London's EMO supporters suffered a supreme humiliation in May, 1970, when co-ordinator Fred Reynolds was stopped for a provincial highway safety check.

The EMO station wagon was declared a threat to the motoring public and its plates were removed.

During the 1971 blizzard, the local EMO officer was again immobilized and people began wondering what might happen in the event of a nuclear attack if a snowstorm could cripple the city so.

Hermann Schiffmann, a local jeweller who survived the destruction of Nazi Germany, decided to organize his own emergency organization, a volunteer groups which he calls "Emergency London."

"It was started out of the realization that EMO is practically dead," says Schiffmann, who believes the organization of neighborhood volunteers are needed to cope with disasters, peacetime or wartime.

He claims support from up to 500 people who are taking stock of the skills and equipment within their own areas of the city.

"The blizzard made it obvious that it is difficult to look after a disaster from one centralized spot."

Schiffmann proposes loose-knit, decentralized organization that can spring into action when and where needed, without the restricted influence of a central office or committee.

"We are not preparing for wartime disasters," he says. "That doesn't mean it could not happen. But, without a very, very far-reaching plan from the government, individual efforts will be pretty fruitless."

"Considering possible atomic warfare, to protect yourself is way past the financial capabilities of most people. To build a shelter here and there, what good does that do? At best, you will have murder at the entrance to those shelters.

"If I was in a target area, I would sooner not seek any shelter at all. I don't want to be a cynic about it, but I think the best thing to do is step outside. It would be quick, wouldn't it?"

Like its government-funded counterpart in London, Schiffmann's volunteer organization is low-profile, a one-room operation in the basement of his Northland Mall jewelry store.

What is left of EMO is called the London-Middlesex Disaster and Emergency Planning Committee, whose sole employee is retired air force officer Donald McCracken. He occupies an out-of-the-way basement office in the old Manpower building at Talbot Street and Queens Avenue, a reflection of the importance placed by local politicians on the operation.

In a room beyond darkened corridors and stock-rooms, McCracken with the help of a part-time secretary, maps disaster scenarios and makes sure civil authorities are aware of their responsibilities should this or that happen.

London and Middlesex have devised a master plan to tackle major emergencies. Under it, all department chiefs head for an operation centre at police headquarters to direct emergency staff such as police, firemen, rescue workers, medical personnel, engineers.

Actions and reactions have been charted to cope with any number of peacetime catastrophes, from trains crashes, chemical spills, gas line ruptures, hurricanes, blizzards, floods, even a major air crash.

McCracken stresses his job is not that of a "co-ordinator" of emergency operations. "My job is before the event; to play devil's advocate and try to figure things out and what to do."

He is gathering information on the types and volumes of deadly chemicals which are freighted through London each day. A truck-train crash could force evacuations and treatments that are currently a mystery.

McCracken's day is consumed almost totally by potential peacetime problems. Boxes of pamphlets from Ottawa — 11 Steps to Survival, Your Blueprint for Survival — sit unused, unwanted in storage. In a corner, atop a cupboard, sits a dusty

cutaway model of a basement fall-out shelter, a reminder of the days before detente.

Elsewhere, there are other, more tangible, pieces of architecture from the period, including what cynics call the "Diefenbunker," a link in a chain of underground installations to which the federal government can withdraw under the threat of nuclear attack.

The shelters are spotted through the Ottawa and St. Lawrence valleys, ready to help a wartime government survive. They are stockpiled for up to 14 days, the critical time period for radioactive fall-out.

Other shelters — they are called Regional Emergency Government Headquarters — are strategically placed near provincial capitals. The Ontario government would withdraw to its underground nest near Camp Borden, about 50 miles northwest of Toronto.

There, too, is the provincial warning centre, headed by Armed Forces Captain Robert Thomason, who can trigger the 579 sirens still roosting around Ontario. The warning centre can also cut into the CBC radio network with alerts.

"John Jones in the street has less interest in a nuclear war and is less concerned because he probably wants to be less concerned," says the captain. "He doesn't want to worry about a nuclear holocaust and therefore he convinces himself not to believe in one."

"But so far our procedures are concerned, it's the same today as it always has been and, in fact, we are updating our system at all times."

The system is linked in the DEW line and the ballistics missile early warning posts, further north.

EMO, as such, died at the federal level nearly two years ago. Its job was taken over by the National Emergency Planning Establishment, operating on a \$3½ million budget to keep Canada prepared — for anything.

"A great deal of emphasis is being placed on peacetime disaster planning," says NEPE director C. R. Patterson.

"But I wouldn't want to give the impression that the civil aspect of wartime preparedness is being ignored, because it is not."

The federal government, however, is no longer peddling the literature on holocausts, although you

can get it if you want it. That was of another time, when Art Townsend blasted into the rock of Sudbury.

"We use it for storage now," says the architect of his unique shelter, "but I suppose if the craze ever appeared again, well, it's in the building and it's not waste space . . .

"I would think that some people might still consider it a reasonable feature, even though they might laugh a bit about it.

"Insurance, I suppose that might have been the thought at the time. It's there if we ever need it." ▲

---

## GRADUAL RENAISSANCE OF CIVIL DEFENCE IN BRITAIN

In a recent report by Brig. W. F. Thompson, Defence Correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph, it was stated that in 1971, responsibility for preparing contingency plans for survival and recovery in war was made a statutory responsibility of local government.

The existence of practical and well-concerted plans for war emergencies, plans in which the general public had confidence, would be a most important factor during a period of severe international tension.

Only if the morale and cohesion of the nation can be maintained through a period of crisis can national diplomacy avoid the stark choice between war or the surrender of the national interest.

To see how far local authorities had progressed in discharging this responsibility, he visited the Home Defence Staff College at Easingwold, Yorks. Set up by the Home Office and opened in September 1973, the college has a target this year of 2,350 students.

This number can be broken down into elected members of local government, 500; chief executives, 200; senior police officers, 200; members of study groups, mainly asked for by central government departments 350; chief local government officers, 250; Home Defence scientific advisers, 150; and a variety of specialist courses for emergency planning staffs, police war duties and so on, totalling 700 students.

To get Home Defence planning going on the right lines, and such planning covers peace-time

emergencies, such as the crash of civil aircraft or a disaster such as Flixborough, the college regards the elected members of county and district councils and their chief executives as their most important customers.

The chief executives are the lynch-pins of the emergency planning system as, in a war situation, they become the area controllers upon whom devolve all the powers of central government in the event of a break-down of communications.

The attitudes of councils and of councillors towards their Home Defence responsibilities vary greatly. It is the aim of the college to ensure that if a council decides to ignore its statutory responsibility and gamble with the lives of those for whom it is responsible, such a decision is not taken from ignorance.

Local authority planning is still at a very elementary stage and in many areas it has hardly begun. It has been held back firstly, by the general upheaval of local government reorganization, and now by the amount of time that government is having to devote to restricting local government expenditure.

In England and Wales, 46 out of 54 county chief executives and 8 out of 100 district chief executives have attended the college. Reorganization of local government in Scotland being a year behind, courses for their councillors and chief executives have not yet begun but will do so shortly.

Northern Ireland has its own peculiar emergencies which it practises daily.



# SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE SEVENTIES

*Commissioned by the United States Defense Civil Preparedness Agency to review civil defense policies, activities and current preparedness of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic, author Leon Goure of the Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, submitted his analysis which was approved for publication in September 1975.*

*In addition to the following excerpts: Introduction, Conclusion and Summary, the 103 page review devotes chapters to:*

- Soviet Views on the Threat and Defense Readiness
- The Soviet View of the Role of Civil Defense
- The Mission and Status of Soviet Defense
- The Organization of Soviet Civil Defense
- Protection of the Population
- Protection of the Economy
- Civil Defense Operations — Warning and Post-Strike Rescue, Repair and Recovery
- Training
- Shortcomings

*The editor of the Digest herewith expresses his appreciation to DCPA for permission to reprint sections of the report which though approved for publication by that agency, does not signify the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of DCPA.*

## I. Introduction

Like a number of Western countries, the Soviet Union has had a war survival, or as it is commonly called, a civil defense organization and program, for a long time. Indeed, the Soviet Union will celebrate the 43rd anniversary of this organization in October 1975. While the longevity of the Soviet Civil Defense Program is not surprising, its scope, direction of development and the amount of resources which continue to be invested in it are highly significant for understanding the Soviet views on war and the possibility of its occurrence, as well as on the nature of East-West relations and the persistent Soviet effort to shift the "correlation of forces" between the opposing systems in its favor. Furthermore, the character of the Soviet program and the national survival capabilities it seeks to achieve have important implications for the U.S. deterrence posture, and Moscow's risk calculations in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives, and

may significantly influence Soviet crisis management tactics and negotiatory strategies under conditions of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

The most striking aspect of the Soviet Civil Defense Program in the '70's is that Moscow's interest and activities in this area have not been weakened or reduced by the U.S.-Soviet detente and by the arms control agreements signed at the various summit meetings in the past three years. In fact, the evidence indicates that Soviet efforts and investments in this program, which had markedly increased after Brezhnev's personal call for the "perfecting of civil defense" at the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966, have been further stepped up since the May 1972 Moscow Summit Meeting, which formally launched the detente in U.S.-Soviet relations. Paralleling present calls of the leadership for raising the "combat readiness" of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Soviet Civil Defense Program

for the 70's also is clearly intended to place Soviet civil defense on an increasingly higher level of operational readiness.

Because of the need to inform the general public and various bureaucracies as well as the large civil defense organization about the program, its direction of development and objectives, as well as its successes and shortcomings, much of the civil defense activities are discussed in open Soviet publications, which are often surprisingly candid about the state of affairs in civil defense. Thus, there exists a large body of open Soviet sources, consisting of numerous books, pamphlets, journals and newspaper articles, posters, broadcasts and speeches by Soviet leaders and spokesmen, and photographs, in addition to observations by foreign travelers in the Soviet Union, which provide a great deal of information on and insights into Soviet justifications for civil defense, as well as its doctrine, plans, programs, and their implementation. At the same time, however, like many other aspects of Soviet defense-related activities, the authorities maintain secrecy about various specific aspects of the Soviet Civil Defense Program, such

as its annual budget and total costs, actual capability, state of readiness, numbers of persons involved in it, identity of cities and localities whose population is slated for pre-attack evacuation, or the leadership's real assessment of its effectiveness. While Soviet secrecy thus prevents a complete and fully reliable assessment of the capabilities of Soviet civil defense, the available information concerning it leaves no doubt that the Soviet leadership takes civil defense very seriously, and that it is striving to achieve a significant capability to protect the population and the economy from weapons of "mass destruction" in order to try to ensure the survival of the Soviet Union in a nuclear war.

This survey of Soviet civil defense programs and activities focuses primarily on developments since 1970,<sup>1</sup> and especially on those which have occurred since the U.S.-Soviet detente, i.e., since mid-1972. In particular, the study will relate Soviet views on civil defense to current Soviet perceptions of war and national security, as well as identify and describe recent changes in Soviet civil defense doctrine and practices.

## XI. Conclusions

It is clearly evident that the detente in U.S.-Soviet relations has not led to any decline of civil defense in the Soviet Union. On the contrary, since 1972, a marked upsurge has taken place in the Soviet Civil Defense Program which has, and continues, to significantly improve the U.S.S.R.'s civil defense capability. The calls for upgrading civil defense and raising its level of readiness coincide with the calls by the Soviet political and military leadership for the further strengthening of Soviet defense capabilities and for constant improvements in the "combat" readiness of the armed forces. More than ever before, the Soviet leaders give evidence of viewing civil defense as an integral part of the Soviet defense posture and as a significant strategic factor in the military balance and in Soviet efforts to attain a war-fighting and war-recovery capability.

The Civil Defense Program introduced in 1972 appears to reflect a certain sense of urgency. The Soviet authorities seem willing to invest greater resources than hitherto into the program in order to attain a significantly higher level of civil defense capability. This is reflected in the decision to increase the rate and scope of shelter construction, to build special training sites at factories and col-

lective farms, to complete the equipping of the civil defense formations, and to provide more training equipment for persons not in the formations. The new insistence on more practical and realistic training, and the growing scope of civil defense exercises ("tactical-specialized," at the training sites, factory- and farm-wide, town- and district-wide) attest to the seriousness of the effort being made by the Soviet authorities to raise the operational readiness of civil defense to a new level.

The current Soviet Civil Defense Program suggests that the authorities may be placing less reliance than before on receiving an early strategic warning of an attack, or at least that the current aim is to develop a civil defense capability to deal with the "worst possible case," i.e., a surprise attack, although Soviet military and civil defense doctrines persist in stressing the importance of Soviet pre-emptive strikes in order to blunt any U.S. attack on the Soviet Union. This appears to be reflected not only in the efforts to sharply improve the operational readiness of the civil defense system and of its personnel, as well as Altunin's call for providing ready shelters for the entire urban population, but in the search for



methods to expedite the evacuation of urban residents and the construction of fallout shelters. The pre-strike evacuation and dispersal of the inhabitants of large cities is still viewed as the preferred measure for protecting the population from the direct effects of a nuclear attack. But there now appears to be a view that such evacuation would have to be carried out in a shorter period than heretofore (the earlier plan appeared to call for 72 hours). This has led to a new emphasis on the evacuation of a portion of the population on foot rather than allowing the urban residents to wait for transportation, as was the practice in the past. It appears that this approach to the evacuation problem is expected to significantly reduce casualties in the event that an attack occurs while the evacuation is still in progress. Similarly, efforts are underway to shorten the time needed for the construction of hasty fallout shelters through the wider use of mechanized construction equipment, of pre-fabricated parts and the exercising of the building of such shelters.

As before, the primary mission of Soviet Civil Defense is to assure the continued operation of vital industries and services under war conditions and the production of weapons and equipment to sustain any war effort. Consequently, the main focus of the Soviet program is on the preservation of the productive forces, the safeguarding of essential facilities, and on capabilities to conduct extensive rescue, damage-limiting, emergency repair and recovery operations in a post-strike situation. Indeed, Soviet spokesmen are fond of quoting Lenin's saying that "the first production force of all mankind is the worker, the toiler. If he survives, we shall save and rebuild everything." There is no doubt that the "worker" is in fact the best trained, organized and equipped, from a civil defense point of view. He has the best shelters, and is most likely to have priority in any urban evacuation. At the same time, Soviet sources indicate that the program of dispersal of new industries and the hardening of existing facilities is continuing. In their attempt to assure the survival of vital industries and of continuing essential production, the Soviet authorities appear to have come to look at the total industrial capabilities of the Warsaw Pact countries as an integrated, mutually supporting, system under war conditions, in which surviving Eastern European production facilities could be substituted for destroyed Soviet facilities.

Soviet sources also suggest that the size of the military civil defense forces is growing. In recent years these forces have come to play an increasing-

ly important role in dealing with natural disasters. In addition, there is greater emphasis now on joint exercises by military and civilian civil defense units and on a greater degree of coordination of plans of the two elements of Soviet Civil Defense. While there is no conclusive evidence, one gains the impression that the military chiefs of U.S.S.R. Civil Defense place greater confidence in the effectiveness of the military civil defense forces to initiate the immediate post-strike rescue operations. Even so, the need for a large civilian civil defense force to carry out numerous civil defense tasks on the enormous scale which a war would necessitate remains.

The gains made by Soviet Civil Defense in its preparedness are by no means uniform. It should be noted, however, that this does not appear to be due to any deliberate assignment of priorities to one region of the Soviet Union as against another. In other words, there is nothing to suggest that the Soviet Civil Defense Program is primarily designed against a Chinese threat. Indeed, some of the western regions of the U.S.S.R. give evidence of being the leaders in civil defense preparedness. The shortcomings discussed in Soviet publications indicate that they are largely a function of the attitudes of particular local administrators, managers and party organizations, rather than the result of deliberate neglect by higher authorities. And, of course, the identification in the press and over the radio of those localities, organizations and facilities which fail to measure up, and frequently of the names of the responsible officials as well, serve as a spur to bring about their correction.

The present objectives of the Soviet Civil Defense Program, as stated by its Chief, Colonel-General Altunin, are: ready shelters for all residents of cities and installations likely to be targets in a nuclear strike; an acceleration of the pre-attack evacuation and dispersal of urban residents; training of the entire population and of the civil defense formations in the practice of appropriate civil defense actions; thorough preparedness of civil defense leaders, commanders and staffs; high state of readiness of all civil defense formations; and the conducting of exercises on an increasingly larger scale, all of which will require time to implement. Of course, a significant civil defense capability was already in existence when Altunin became the Chief of U.S.S.R. Civil Defense, but what he appears to seek to do is to bring civil defense closer in line with the level of readiness and the effectiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

According to Altunin, 1975 will see further efforts to implement the new training program. In particular, the emphasis will be on improving the training of the general population, civil defense command-staffs and formations, the construction of more special-training sites and the holding of regular exercises at the sites, and on the building of more

shelters. Clearly, the aim is to lay a solid foundation and to bring the entire civil defense system up to a level which will make possible further efforts to prepare Soviet Civil Defense to become truly effective in the performance of its missions in a war situation.

## Summary

The analysis of Soviet leadership pronouncements and open sources indicates that an unrelenting struggle for dominance between the Communist and Western systems will continue. In the Soviet view, despite the East-West detente, the nature of that struggle does not fully eliminate the threat of war and, consequently, requires further improvements in the Soviet deterrence, war-fighting and war-survival capabilities.

Soviet civil defense is perceived as an integral part of Soviet overall defense capability, as a "strategic factor," and as influencing the overall balance of forces between the opposing systems. Accordingly, U.S.S.R. Civil Defense is listed on par with the other branches of the Soviet Armed Forces, and is considered to be an essential factor for ensuring the survival of the Soviet Union, and for the attainment of "victory" in a war. At the same time, it is recognized that the effectiveness of civil defense will depend on the ability of the Soviet strategic forces to blunt an enemy nuclear attack by means of pre-emptive, counter-force nuclear strikes.

The data shows that the status and scope of Soviet civil defense has been upgraded since the start of the 1972 Moscow Summit Meeting, with the present Chief of U.S.S.R. Civil Defense also holding the post of Deputy U.S.S.R. Minister of Defense. The size of the military civil defense forces appears to be increasing, while the organization and preparedness of the large civilian civil defense forces have been improved and greater attention is being paid to the civil defense program by local administrative and party organizations.

The Soviet Civil Defense Program calls for a range of measures for the protection of the population, the organization, equipping and training of large civil defense formations, the dispersal and hardening of vital industries and services to ensure continuous essential production in wartime, the protection of agriculture, food and water sup-

plies, and the compulsory training of the entire population. The mission of civil defense is to protect the population, industry and agriculture in wartime, to conduct emergency rescue, damage-limiting, repair and restoration work in nuclear strike zones, as well as to assist in the event of natural disasters.

Recent developments in the program indicate new efforts to accelerate the pre-attack evacuation of urban residents from potential target areas by means of organized removal of a portion of them on foot; increased emphasis on shelter construction, with the apparent goal being to provide ready shelter space for all residents of potential urban targets for attack, continuing concern for industrial dispersal, hardening and urban planning to reduce the vulnerability of vital industries to attack, including preparations for using the industries of other East European countries to substitute for destroyed Soviet defense production facilities; improvements in the post-strike rescue, damage-limiting, repair and restoration capabilities; and the upgrading in the training and preparedness of civil defense formations and of the population, with particular emphasis on "realistic" training, which requires the construction of special training sites; expanding the scope of exercises held at individual plants, as well as in some cases encompassing entire urban or rural districts (rayons), with plans for progressively wider and more complex exercises to be held in the future. At the same time, the data indicates the persistence of low public confidence in civil defense measures and of shortcomings and unevenness in the implementation of the program. Even so, Soviet sources indicate that investments in civil defense have been increased and that serious efforts are underway to significantly raise the level of Soviet civil defense readiness and capabilities which, it appears to be believed, can make a major contribution to the Soviet defense posture, deterrence and war-survival capabilities, as well as to Soviet population morale and political leverage in a crisis situation. ▲

## Quebec Civil Protection

# "HELPING MUNICIPALITIES HELP THEMSELVES"

by  
Fernande Lemieux  
Le Soleil, Quebec City

I am in an emergency room humming with activity in the Duberger section of Quebec City. Somewhere in the province a disaster has occurred or is to be expected, but Civil Protection is ready for the worst and those in charge are alert to any eventuality.

There is a constant flow of communication between the affected area, which has put its emergency plan into operation, and Quebec Civil Protection, which acts as co-ordinator between the municipalities, government and semi-public agencies, police agencies at all levels and even the armed forces.

If the emergency plan is implemented as intended, minimum damage will be done and many human lives will probably be saved.

These precautions are necessary when it is realized that last year some 55 disasters struck the province, ranging from power failures and snowstorms to floods and tornadoes. To give some idea of the work of Civil Protection, 212,627 hours were worked by 2,582 men.

But what is Quebec Civil Protection?

### Original Concept

To find out about it, I met its general director, Marcel Bru, at the agency's headquarters building at 358 Jackson Street in the Duberger section of Quebec City.

The general idea of civil defence originated in the possibility of a nuclear war involving the North American continent after the Second World War and during the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was highlighted by the presence of missiles in Cuba in 1963.

You will no doubt recall the campaign to encourage the Canadian people to build nuclear fallout shelters in case of an atomic explosion. Governments established emergency wartime headquarters. Ours is located at Valcartier and can accommodate a staff of 95 to 100 persons to provide continuity of both federal and provincial government operations.

Times have changed, however, and the danger of a nuclear war is fading. Quebec Civil Protection

services have therefore been redirected to peacetime man-made or natural disasters. As indicated earlier, their scope is very wide.

### The Municipalities at the Centre

"There are approximately 1,600 municipalities in Quebec. Every one of them is vulnerable", Mr Bru noted, "and our civil defence co-ordination and advisory activities are directed towards them."

Since its beginning, and especially for the past five years, QCP has endeavoured to inventory the human and material resources of the various municipalities and regions. Sometimes without knowing it, local authorities have considerable resources at their disposal.

They had to be persuaded of this however, by means of a well-defined five-year plan for the development of an emergency program adaptable to all municipalities. This started in 1970, with the co-operation of various provincial ministries, semi-governmental agencies, the police, Hydro Quebec, the armed forces, etc. This planning period for an emergency program with uniform provisions throughout the province already involves some 800 municipalities in Quebec.

Because of other priorities, the federal government has had to decrease its aid, but Mr Bru emphasized that the provincial government has gradually replaced it and does not stint on its effective contribution. Furthermore, Ottawa is always ready to step in the event of a serious emergency.

### Evaluation

The shelves of the Civil Protection building are lined with an impressive number of thick loose-leaf binders giving information under uniform headings about the human and material resources of the municipalities that already have emergency programs. The municipalities, of course, have their own copy.

These books contain an inventory of resources in the areas of health and social services, police, firefighting, technical services, communications, transportation, information, radiation protection (detection of radioactivity), rescue services, war-dens, supplies and manpower.

Each book is constantly revised, and Civil Protection is kept informed of deaths, transfers or appointments of those responsible for the various services listed above. Their duties are precisely defined, and the program drawn up by Civil Protection attempts to provide for all contingencies.

It should be noted that the mayor and clerk of the municipality are in general immediately in charge of disaster operations. QCP exists only to provide advice and reinforcement to the mayor and his co-ordinator in serious cases.

"Our main aim is to help municipalities help themselves", noted Mr Bru. He added: "Barring events beyond our control, there is no reason why the emergency program should not work as planned."

### **A Vast Network**

In addition to providing municipalities with devices to detect radioactive leaks, Civil Protection has set up a vast communications network covering nearly every part of the province, which is divided into ten administrative regions.

The metropolitan Quebec region, directed by Mr Roger Boucher, with its headquarters in Ancienne-Lorette, has 25 stations capable of receiving and transmitting all the required information. The province has about 425 such stations, and it is hoped that every municipality will have its own by 1980, depending on funding.

Nearly everywhere in Quebec, advanced devices, known as "repeaters", installed on mountains automatically record messages for subsequent retransmission to those concerned. One of these devices will soon be installed in the Rimouski area, for example.

The Quebec Police Force plays an important part in this network, as does Hydro-Quebec. The QPF has special emergency teams and is linked to the network, as are Hydro-Quebec and, of course, the Quebec executive. In the event of a disaster, QCP also joins the network to give instructions.

### **Maps**

Furthermore, the QCP Centre has an impressive map section that in most cases has detailed maps

covering 250 square miles. For some regions, particularly in the far north where mapping is not completed, the scale is 500 square miles.

These maps are obviously very useful for searches in forested areas, for example. They proved invaluable in rescuing Father Antonio Arsenault who had gone on a trip on the Montmorency River. His companion drowned in the incident, which occurred in September 1974.

Finally, it should be noted that the director of Civil Protection is authorized to call upon the Armed Forces if necessary. This was done at the time of the celebrated snowstorm in November 1974 when Valcartier had to provide vehicles to come to the aid of stranded motorists whose lives might have been in danger.

Last year more than 4,000 persons across the province took special courses in all aspects of civil defence, under the direction of Mr J.-P. Morin. These courses were intended for auxiliary personnel and those in charge of the various agencies that would come into action in the event of man-made or natural disasters. The classroom training was accompanied by appropriate exercises.

The Civil Protection Centre has an abundance of literature giving extensive information on what to do in the event of floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, winter power failures, storms, and chlorine leaks. This literature is prepared by the Emergency Planning Canada.

The booklet "11 Steps for Survival" contains a wealth of information on emergency supplies, fire-fighting, first aid and public health.

Some booklets can be obtained from the Civil Protection Centre at 358 Jackson Street in Duberger or from the Canadian Red Cross or the headquarters of the Saint John Ambulance. You can also write to: Emergency Planning Canada, Ottawa, K1A 0W6. Some are free and others cost as little as 9¢.

These booklets complement QCP's planning work and tell you what to do during and after a disaster. ▲